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Introduction
The rapid advance of information technologies has produced a large 
amount of waste of electronic and electrical equipment (WEEE). WEEE 
or e- waste, refers to old, end-of-life (EoL) or discarded electronic appli-
ances. The world produces 20 to 50 million metric tons of e-waste annually 
(Electronics Take-back Coalition 2009), of which China alone contributes 
2 million tons. Each year at least 6 million washing machines, 7 million 
TV sets, 10 million PCs and 70 million mobile phones are discarded and 
the number increases at the rate of more than 10 per cent each year 
(Hung 2007), according to the report from the resource and environment 
comprehensive utilization department of the State Development and 
 Reform Commission (SDRC 2006). Discarded electronic products contain 
a stew of toxic metals and chemicals such as lead, mercury, cadmium, 
chromium and polychlorinated biphenyls (Scott 2007) and cause great 
harm to the environment. Recycling and reusing e-waste are thus becom-
ing an increasingly important global issue.
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is defined as “a policy princi-
ple to promote total life-cycle environmental improvements of product 
systems by extending the responsibilities of the manufacturer of the 
product to various parts of the entire life-cycle of the product, and espe-
cially to the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product” 
 (Lindhqvist 1992). The ultimate goal of controlling e-waste is minimizing 
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the impact on the environment of EoL products. E-waste recycling involves 
product and systems design that take EoL products into account. In  order 
to fully integrate product retirement concerns into design considerations, 
it is necessary to gather feedback and internalize costs and data.  Although 
EPR determines that producers have leading responsibility in this, other 
parties, including consumers, retailers, recyclers and governments need to 
contribute to this process.
Extended producer responsibility practices
Definition and legislation in different countries
The extended producer responsibility (EPR) concept was first formally 
used in Sweden by Thomas Lindhqvist in 1992 in a report to the Swedish 
Ministry of the Environment. The Swedish reports further specified how 
manufacturers should take responsibility for their products, including 
their liability, and their responsibilities in terms of the economic, physical 
and information aspects of doing so. In 2000 the European Parliament 
passed a directive requiring its member countries to institute EPR pro-
grammes for EoL vehicles (Forslind 2005) and an additional directive for 
waste electronics and electrical equipment (WEEE) was approved in 
early 2003. This is not only a European phenomenon; as, for example, 
Japan has also enacted an EPR law covering four large electrical home 
appliances (TV sets, refrigerators, air conditioners and washing machines) 
(Spicer and Johnson 2004). The USA established a similar system with 
variations focusing more on product responsibility, instead of products 
themselves. Table 9.1 shows the definitions and explanations of EPR in 
respective legislations.
In addition, scholars have explored relevant practices in different re-
gions (such as Sweden, Germany, the USA, Japan and Taiwan) and across 
different products (printers, PCs, motor cars and batteries) (Forslind 
2005; Hanisch 2000; Lee 2008; Mayers 2005). They reached a consensus 
recognizing that EPR policies can actually stimulate product innovation 
and environmentally friendly design in reducing the use of materials, 
 resources and energy by eliminating the use of toxins, extending the use-
ful life cycle, increasing opportunities for the recovery and reuse of prod-
ucts at their Eo and creating new forms of product delivery, such as a 
leasing product service system (McKerlie 2006; Nicol and Thompson 
2007; Tojo 2001).
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Extended producer responsibility modes of implementation and 
capital operation
Depending on how thoroughly it is implemented and how much the gov-
ernment is involved, there are three models of EPR implementation. The 
first is the voluntary model, that is, producers take measures to decrease 
the impact of their products on pollution. For example, enterprises devise 
a take-back plan and recycle their products at their EoL. The second is 
the enforcement model, as obligated by the government, in the govern-
ment forces manufactures to recycle their products. The third is the eco-
nomic model, realized by incentives such as an ecology tax, pre-fee for 
recycling, and deposit return (Wanggan 2006).
Table 9.1 Definition and EPR legislation in Europe
Europe Japan USA
Legislation WEEE
Restriction of 
Hazardous 
Substances
Package and EOL 
Vehicles
Home Appliance
Recycling Law
Extended product 
responsibility
The state of 
California 
imposed an 
electronic waste 
recycling fee on 
new purchases 
of electronic 
products with 
viewable screens.
Responsibilities
 Producers
 Consumers
 Government
Collection, recycling, 
disposal and 
charging the fee
Pay the recycling fee 
and insure the 
integrity of 
e-waste
Pay a part of fee of 
collection, 
disposable or 
make policy of 
fiscal subsidies of 
EPR organization
Complete recycling 
rate index
Should inform the 
retailer when 
home appliances 
retire
Enforce legislation In EPR system, 
producer, 
supplier and 
customer take 
on responsibility 
for the 
environmentally 
appropriate 
disposal of 
e-waste
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In terms of capital operations, in Europe, Korea and Taiwan the cost 
comes from the producer, while in Japan it comes from the consumer. 
The USA is an exception. With no legislation on the EPR principle, it 
refuses to impose a burden on the original manufacturer [Wu et al. 2008)] 
arguing that this model is not appropriate to keeping the lowest social 
cost.
The take-back model
There are three EPR take-back models: original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM), pool and third-party take-back. The OEM take-back model is an 
EPR system in which the OEM themselves take physical and economic 
responsibility for the products they have manufactured. In the pooled 
take-back model the physical and economic responsibilities for products 
are assumed by consortia of manufacturers, usually grouped by product 
category. The third-party take-back model is an alternative approach 
where private companies assume EoL responsibilities for products on 
 behalf of the OEM. In such cases the OEM pays a fee to a product respon-
sibility provider, who then undertakes to ensure that the manufacturer’s 
products are retired in a way that is environmentally responsible and 
compliant with EPR legislation. The basis and standards underlying these 
models and their effects have been compared. The OEM take-back model 
has an advantage in feedback, since the manufacturers are simply directly 
responsible for their own products at EoL. Therefore, this is more feasi-
ble for big companies than small ones, but it raises a barrier of scale for 
small companies and cannot resolve the problem of orphaned products, 
while the pooled take-back system can address the issues on orphaned 
products. However, it is impossible for pooled systems to gather feedback 
from economic indicators and achieve the goal of sharing information 
and closed-loop recycling. In contrast, the third-party take-back model 
has advantages for both manufacturers and the general public and 
 appears to be a promising approach in optimizing product design, spe-
cialization, immediate economic feedback and demanufacturing market 
development (Spicer and Johnson 2004; Zhong and Schiller 2009).
China’s implementation of extended producer responsibility 
China takes the long view in the exploration and practice of e-waste 
 recycling. Government agencies deployed four national pilot projects for 
WEEE recycling and management between 2003 and 2005, in Beijing, 
Tianjin, Qingdao and Hangzhou. The typical process of Chinese legisla-
tion is to first formulate lower level ordinances and regulations, then to 
gather detailed information in pilot studies, and finally, to draft a national 
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law on a particular issue (Yang 2007). Legislation relating to e-waste 
 recycling includes “The People’s Republic of China Solid Waste Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law”, “The People’s Republic of China Cleaner 
Production Promotion Law”, “Discarded Household Appliances and 
Electronic Products Pollution Control Technology Policy”, “Electronic 
Information Products Pollution Control Regulations”, the recent “Sub-
sidy Program for the Replacement of Household Appliances” and the forth-
coming “Waste Electrical and Electronic Product Recycling Regulations”.
Although we may glimpse EPR concepts in these regulations, as at the 
time of writing there has still been no clear definition of EPR practice in 
China. As a result, as far as collection and recycling networks are con-
cerned, very slow progress has been made, and this has become a bottle-
neck to recycling. The key obstacle is that the costs are higher than they 
are when EEE is collected informally. In other words, it lacks a coordi-
nating mechanism to stimulate and engage all parties involved in the re-
cycling process.
In current conditions it is not realistic for China to aim at the volun-
tary implementation of EPR. In addition to a legal obligation, the coun-
try needs the help of third-party take-back economic methods to push for 
the adoption of EPR, especially if this is an efficient profit model involv-
ing integrative, systematic optimum mechanism design to realize effi-
ciency in recycling e-waste.
Building an extended producer responsibility third-party 
e-waste recycling system
Overall framework
In response to the existing problem and in accordance with the principles 
of standard recycling, scientific classification, specialized disposal and the 
harmless reuse of products, this chapter develops a model of a scientific 
e-waste recycling system (EWRS), addressing both the collection and dis-
posal of e-waste. This system, as a third-party recycling organization, aims 
to engage the interests of all stakeholder: producers, consumers, govern-
ment, retailers and disposal sites; and achieve the dynamic control and 
management of all the relevant processes by applying an e-commerce 
platform (see Figure 9.1.).
Analysis of the stakeholders in the recycling platform 
All recycling systems comprise a reverse supply chain. A system mecha-
nism design should coordinate all stakeholders, whose responsibilities and 
obligations in the platform are discussed later in this chapter.
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The consumer, a supplier of e-waste, plays an important role in the 
 reverse supply chain. Therefore, motivating the consumer is the key to 
the recycling platform operations. The system should take into account 
the consumer’s bargaining power in order to avoid the deal failure. In 
particular, the recycling price should be based on analysis of the demand 
by interviewing consumers.
The recycling centre, as the provider of product and the reverse supply 
chain plan, has a close relationship with the original manufacturers 
through a contract with the principle agent. It receives e-waste collection 
and recycling fees from these producers together with government sub-
sidies, and gathers revenues from the second-hand market by selling 
 refurbished products. The core tasks of the recycling centre are to take a 
reasonable inventory, realize management scalability and maintain sus-
tainable business.
The producer, as the EPR performer, is the real heart of the recycling 
system. On the one hand, from the viewpoint of a restraint mechanism-
based contract of commission, the producer must pay a disposal fee in 
accordance with the complexity of disassembly of a particular product. 
As a result, producers will naturally be motivated to improve their prod-
uct design. At the same time, from the standpoint of motivation, the gov-
ernment should offer subsidies and a refund mechanism or encourage 
compliance via a carbon tax, in order to encourage producers to fulfil 
their social responsibility.
The government, as the agent of enforcement, must focus on making 
efficient policies that provide incentives to producers, consumers and 
 recyclers simultaneously in all the recycling systems in the large-scale 
control process. For instance, central government can focus on making 
Figure 9.1 EPR Third-party e-commerce recycling system framework
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policies for allocating funds for subsidies and creating standards and ob-
jectives, together with supervising the EPR system.
Recycling system process design
Using an online system, consumers will submit the e-waste information, 
including the product category, brand, model, purchase date and its cur-
rent condition via the internet or over the phone. The system will then 
automatically generate a list of the items to be recycled, which will be 
picked up by professionals from a third-party recycler. The recycling price 
will be decided by the special assessing system. After the transaction, the 
third-party recycler will pay the consumer over the internet or in cash. 
The e-waste will then be transferred to an e-waste recycling centre, a 
third firm dedicated to recovering reusable materials from EoL products 
and selling them in second-hand markets. Once it has been delivered to 
the recycling centre, the e-waste will first be inspected to determine 
whether it can be repaired or should be disassembled. Repaired products 
could be sold in second-hand markets, while disassembled EoL products 
will be separated into reusable, recyclable and disposable materials, send-
ing each to its appropriate inventory. The reusable and recycling compo-
nents will be tested for their usability potential before they are sent to a 
producer or retailer, and the disposable components will be sent to the dis-
posal site (see Figure 9.2). At the same time, the government will provide 
Figure 9.2 E-waste recycling process
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the subsidy to the recycling centre or to the producers to realize the EPR 
principle.
The way in which the EWRS fulfils the EPR responsibility is the key to 
this system. The following two points need to be addressed: how to define 
the contract between the producer and the recycling agency and how the 
government should help to provide incentives to the producer. In light of 
economic realities, the government should assess the producer’s contribu-
tions when establishing subsidies for recycling and disposal. Forthcoming 
legislation on “Waste Electrical and Electronic Product Recycling Regu-
lations” clearly proposes that the government establish the foundation 
for the subsidy of recycling WEEE, and that both the collection and sub-
sidy guidelines incorporate input from manufacturers, recycling firms and 
relevant experts. Therefore, the EPR principle is already involved in the 
proposed regulation and needs to be reflected through a reasonable con-
tract and pricing mechanism.
E-waste recycling information system design
The e-waste recycling information system is composed of five modules to 
support the functionalities and business operations of the third-party 
 recycler (Table 9.2). The client management module provides for real-time, 
online inquiries for recycling orders and processing information. The 
 recycling processing module manages the recycling centre and documents 
information about the repair, disassembling, refurbishment, recycling and 
disposal of electronics. The inventory is maintained in the inventory man-
agement module. The information system also includes accounting func-
tionalities to process, analyse, and report and manage costs. The logistics 
module collects, processes and presents information to support the reverse 
supply chain through which producers become recipients of recycled 
items.
Table 9.2 E-waste recycling management information system
Recycling Inventory management Accounting Logistics
Client order 
processing
Inventory monitoring Cost analysis Reverse logistics
Recycling centre 
management
Stocking and processing Analysis and 
reports
Information 
collection
Disposed 
products 
management
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Conclusion
In summary, this proposed e-commerce third-party e-waste recycling sys-
tem has three benefits for efficient recycling and pollution reduction 
within the EPR framework:
• It will strengthen the theoretical system of EPR and explore a per-
formance path for developing economies, offering increased economic 
incentives to stimulate all parties to become involved in the recycling 
process.
• It will increase recycling efficiency with the help of advanced informa-
tion technology from the e-commerce information system.
• Using the third-party recycling platform as link, it will balance the 
 interests of all parties and achieve a win–win situation all around. 
 Consumer will be able to have their e-waste conveniently recycled and 
then receive economic compensation in return. Third-party recyclers 
can use the e-commerce platform to collect recycling items on a large 
scale and generate profits by disassembling and refurbishing them. 
Manufacturers can fulfil their social responsibilities and improve their 
corporate image by taking partial financial responsibility for the recy-
cling process according to contracts between them and the third-party 
recyclers. The government will regulate the behaviour of all parties 
through policies and regulations and thus promote societal sustainable 
development, as well as peaceful coexistence between human beings 
and the environment.
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